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Organizing to Fight in the Far Seas
The Chinese Navy in an Era of Military Reform
Roderick Lee and Morgan Clemens

Summary
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been laying the organizational groundwork for far
seas operations for nearly two decades, developing logistical and command infrastructure to support
a “near seas defense and far seas protection” strategy. In the context of such a strategy, the PLAN’s
ability to project power into the far seas depends upon its ability to dominate the near seas,
effectively constituting a “sword and shield” approach. Along with the rest of the PLA, the PLAN’s
peacetime command structure has been brought into line with its wartime command structures, and in
terms of near seas defense, those command structures have been streamlined and made joint. By
contrast, the command arrangements for far seas operations have not been clearly delineated and no
one organ or set of organs has been identified as responsible for them. While this is manageable in
the context of China’s current, limited far seas operational presence, any meaningful increase in the
size, scope, frequency, and intensity of far seas operations will require further structural reforms at
the Central Military Commission and theater command levels in order to lay out clear command
responsibilities.
Introduction
China’s progress towards developing a far seas (远海) navy is not exclusively defined by its growing
order of battle. The ability to conduct effective blue-water operations also requires an organization
designed to employ forces out of area. In recent years, the Chinese military has undergone major
organizational reform. While primarily intended to improve the ability of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) to conduct joint operations within the first island chain, the reform also has implications
for naval operations outside of East Asia.
This report argues that in order to execute a “near seas defense and far seas protection” strategy, the
PLA has taken a two-pronged approach to reforming its forces. On the one hand, the PLA has
dramatically strengthened control and employment of its forces in the near seas. On the other, the
PLA has also made several changes that set the foundations for far seas operations. This tandem
approach acts in some ways as a “sword and shield,” wherein a consolidated defensive position in the
near seas allows offensive forces to project out into the far seas.
The report comprises four main parts. First, we discuss the challenges that PLA reform and PLA
Navy (PLAN) strategy intend to resolve. Second, we highlight key organizational developments
within the PLAN that preceded China’s military reform. Third, we outline the primary focus of the
reform—i.e., strengthening the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations in the near seas—and
examine how this goal has impacted the organizational structure of the PLAN. Lastly, we discuss the
known facts of command and control of PLAN forces operating in the far seas.

The Larger Context of Organizational Reform
As part of the broader process of military reform, the Central Military Commission (CMC) has
sought to address the following challenges:
1. An inadequate leadership management system
2. An inadequate joint operations command system
3. Sub-optimal structure of the People’s Armed Forces
4. Antiquated policy system

5. Inadequate civilian-military integration1
Beijing seeks to modernize the People’s Armed Forces (including the PLA) to win informatized wars
and fulfill Party missions.2 This entails successfully completing three “great campaigns” (三大战役).
The first great campaign sought to improve both the leadership management system and the joint
operations command system for the People’s Armed Forces.3 The core of this campaign occurred
from 2015-2017 and involved the creation of the new CMC structure and theater commands and
reform of the services. Each of these three components is assigned distinct roles: the CMC provides
overall management, the theater commands conduct operations, and the services engage in force
construction (军委管总、战区主战、军种主建).4 Most notably, operational control over PLA
forces is supposed to be managed through a “CMC–Theater Commands–Units” (军委—战区—部
队) command chain.5
The second “great campaign,” which started in 2016, realigned the PLA’s structure to better meet
current strategic requirements. It not only included adjusting manpower allocations across the PLA’s
services, but also the way units are structured. This effort comprised both “neck up” and “neck
down” changes.6 “Neck up” changes refer to any changes made to the structure and disposition of the
CMC, theater commands, and service headquarters. “Neck down” changes refer to changes made to
units at the corps level and below.
The third “great campaign” involved reform of “policy.”7 If one compares the PLA to a computer
system, changes made through the first two reform campaigns were focused on modernizing the
hardware of the system. However, the software must also be updated. Changes to “policy” include
reform of personnel management, training, promotion requirements, education, and other less
tangible issues. Although these are critical to creating a far seas navy, such changes fall outside the
purview of this report.
By late 2018, the PLA viewed itself as having largely completed the first and second of the “great
campaigns.”8 However, the third campaign of policy reform is still not complete. These reform
objectives are to be completed by 2020, creating a PLA that, according to the 19th Party Congress
work report, is fully mechanized and making significant strides towards being informatized.
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Earlier Reforms within the PLAN
The 2015 reform is a driving force for changes in the PLAN, but it is not the only force at play. In
reality, the PLAN and other services are constantly undergoing structural changes, and the majority
of changes in the PLAN that occurred during the “neck down” phase of reform can actually be traced
to PLAN structural changes predating the 2015 reform. Although the strategy of “near seas defense
and far seas protection” (近海防御、远海护卫) was officially adopted in 2015, the PLAN has been
moving towards this strategy since 2004.9 In accordance with then-CMC chairman Hu Jintao’s
guidance, the PLAN embarked on a strategic development phase during which it shifted from a force
built around a “near seas defense” strategy towards a force capable of executing the anticipated “near
seas defense and far seas protection” strategy.10
The 2004 Base Reform
The first major structural shift occurred at the beginning of this strategic development phase. The
PLAN transferred control over first-line combatants and support ships from eight operational bases to
the three fleet headquarters.11 These eight bases had controlled most PLAN maritime forces within a
designated sector of the Chinese coastline. Although this structure was suitable for near seas and
littoral operations, it limited the PLAN’s ability to employ forces on a larger scale. After the change,
the operational bases were downgraded to corps-deputy leader grade support bases that would
provide logistics and equipment support while defending the near seas and littoral regions. 12 While
realignment of the PLAN’s major surface and submarine units under the fleet headquarters freed
these units from the geographic tyranny of the eight-base structure, this left the PLAN with a residual
problem of how to manage defensive operations, logistics, and equipment support. This problem
would remain unresolved until 2017, although the PLAN made numerous efforts to address these
structural issues.
Restructuring for Carrier Task Groups
The commissioning of aircraft carrier Liaoning in 2012 is the most obvious inflection point in the
PLAN’s trajectory towards becoming a far seas navy. However, three other critical but less visible
milestones in the PLAN’s carrier program occurred at roughly the same time. The first came in 2011,
with the creation of its first aircraft carrier task group.13 This corps-deputy leader grade organization
was the PLAN’s first permanent task-oriented unit, and it would set a precedent for how the PLAN
would organize its aircraft carrier force.14
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The second milestone was the creation of the comprehensive support base (综合保障基地).15
Created in 2012, the first comprehensive support base was subordinate to the North Sea Fleet (later
the Northern Theater Navy) and had the explicit role of providing shore support for the aircraft
carrier and its formation.16
Lastly, in 2013 the PLAN created an organizational structure for its carrier aviation forces. The
PLAN stood up a division grade aircraft carrier testing and training base and carrier-embarked
aviation unit.17 Notably, these units do not to appear be subordinate to a fleet headquarters, but it is
unclear to whom they do report, whether PLAN headquarters, a theater command headquarters, or
even the CMC directly.
The Requirements for Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection
The changes the PLAN made from 2004-2014 were ultimately half-measures likely intended to test
various concepts. On the eve of the PLA’s reform in 2015, the PLAN’s organizational transformation
into a force capable of executing a strategy of near seas defense and far seas protection was
incomplete. Both the 2013 Academy of Military Science and 2015 National Defense University
editions of Science of Military Strategy identified additional requirements and changes that the
PLAN needed to enact in order to be able to execute its designated tasks: 18
•

Southward shift of the center of gravity

•

Strong offshore defensive zone from which to radiate outward

•

Aircraft carrier formations (and nuclear submarines)

•

Slimmed down command structure

•

Reduced command layers

•

Task-based units

•

Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance in the distant seas

•

Forward logistics capabilities

The changes outlined in these publications foreshadowed the subsequent reforms the PLAN enacted
during the “neck down” reforms in 2017. However, some requirements saw fuller implementation
than others.
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The Shield—Organizing for Joint Operations in the Near Seas
Although the PLAN’s ability to operate in the far seas is the focus of this report, one of the most
significant challenges for the PLAN in conducting far seas operations is the ability to get there in the
first place. The first island chain is an enormous barrier for Chinese maritime operations, and the
ability to operate outside of that barrier is presupposed on the ability to first operate with impunity
inside that barrier. As identified in the 2013 Science of Strategy, a “large maritime defensive zone”
that creates a favorable posture for operations inside the first island chain also allows for operations
to radiate outwards.19
As such, the vast majority of the structural and command changes within the PLA focus on
establishing maritime control inside the first island chain, thereby creating a defensive shield around
the homeland. This is accomplished through improvements in several organizational areas. First, the
PLA created a joint command structure oriented towards operational mission requirements rather
than the services. Second, the PLA built a permanent and robust shore-based command bureaucracy
that replicates a wartime command structure. Third, the PLAN improved command efficiency by
reducing the number of command layers. Lastly, the PLAN improved the quality of support
organizations in the Southern Theater to ensure the necessary infrastructure to radiate southward.
Joint Coverage through Theater Commands
The CMC’s establishment of joint theater commands and theater command joint operations
command centers has enabled the PLA to reliably plan and command joint operations for the first
time. This ability to conduct joint operations is especially useful within the first island chain, given
the wide range of forces that the PLA has available to use in the near seas.
The theater service components’ command responsibilities are nested within the theater joint
command structure.20 Theater service command centers, which are co-located with the theater service
headquarters, have command authorities over all PLA forces within their primary operational
domains. For example, a theater navy command center has operational control authorities over all
PLA forces conducting maritime operations—not just PLAN forces. Although news sources only
identify three theater domain command elements, presumably this construct exists across all five
theaters and across multiple domains. Exhibit 1 illustrates the relationship between the Theater
Command Joint Operations Command Center and the theater domain command elements. Exhibit 2
lists the known theater domain command entities.
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Exhibit 1. The Relationships between the Theater Command Joint Operations Command Center and
the Theater Domain Command Elements

Theater Command Joint Operations
Command Center
(Theater Command Headquarters)

Maritime Operations Command
Center
(Theater Navy Headquarters)

Air Operations Command Center
(Theater Air Force Headquarters)

Conventional Missile Operations
Command Center
(PLA Rocket Force Unit)

Exhibit 2. Known Theater Domain Command Entities
Organization

Concurrent Domain Command

Eastern Theater Navy Command Post

Theater Maritime Command Sub-Center (战区海上指挥分中心)21

Western Theater Air Force Command Post

Theater Air Operations Command and Control Center (战区空中
作战指挥中心)22

Possible PLA Rocket Force 63rd Base

Theater Conventional Missile Command Sub-Center (战区常导弹
指挥分中心) 23

The available Chinese press reporting on the maritime operations and conventional missile command
sub-centers suggests that these entities have the authority to command units of other services within
their respective theater commands in order to accomplish relevant missions. For example, the Theater
Maritime Command Sub-Center can call upon PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft to provide cover for
submarine operations, whereas previously it could only rely on navy assets.24
The maritime command sub-center’s ability to leverage PLA Ground, Air, and Rocket Forces for
maritime-focused campaigns maximizes the total effectiveness and efficiency of the maritime force.
This is especially the case out to a range of 500km from the Chinese coastline, or roughly within the
first island chain, where the advantages of land-based air defense, missiles, and intelligence,

刘亚迅 [Liu Yaxun],东海舰队适应新体制提升联合作战能力的启示 [“East Sea Fleet Enlightens to the Adoption of
New System to Improve Joint Operational Capabilities”], 人民海军 [People's Navy], October 21, 2017, p. 4.
21

22
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24
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surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are most pronounced.25 While joint operations were
still possible pre-reform era, it would have been far more difficult to accomplish due to lack of
training and familiarity with a truly joint system.
Building Out a Permanent Shore Command Structure
Supporting this theater maritime operations command authority is a reformed regional maritime
command structure beneath the theater level. This new permanent command structure reduces the
chance of initial inefficiencies that are typical when an organization transitions from a peacetime to
wartime command structure. Prior to the 2015 structural reform, the PLA intended to stand up
wartime command entities upon mobilization.26 Although some peacetime command elements such
as bases and maritime garrison districts (MGDs) did exist, the arrangement was overcomplicated and
inconsistent.27 The aforementioned creation of a theater joint operations command center and domain
command centers was an integral first step in this process of reducing the risks associated with a
wartime command transition. However, the PLAN also took steps to create a permanent command
structure at lower levels.
As part of the “neck-down” reforms first announced at the April 2017 “84 Corps” ceremony, the
PLAN consolidated all command and control functions of near seas maritime operations under six
new operational bases.28 These corps-deputy leader grade bases command PLAN forces oriented
towards near seas defense missions, including frigates, fast attack craft, mine warfare craft, and
coastal defense cruise missiles.29 The bases were also assigned a new role as standing “basic
campaign command organizations” (初级战役指挥机关).30 This replaced a confused fleet/baseMGD-units structure in which some of the one dozen MGD’s appeared to report to bases, while
others reported directly to the fleet.
One overlooked element of command and control is logistics. The PLA differentiates “logistics” (后
勤保障) and “equipment support” (装备保障), and this distinction exists at both the CMC and
service level wherein there are two separate departments. However, at the theater service level, the
PLA merged them into a single “support department” (保障部).31 This not only consolidated material
Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future of Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S.
AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security, vol. 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 748.
26
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28
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29
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support responsibilities into a single entity, but it also created a rough command equivalent for
wartime. According to Lectures on Joint Operations Command Organ Work, there is no distinction
between “logistics command posts” (后勤指挥所) and “equipment command posts” (装备指挥所).32
Instead, these functions are consolidated under a “support command post” (保障指挥所). The
creation of theater navy support departments also spawned “theater navy support department
command posts” (战区海军保障部指挥所).33 This created a peacetime equivalent to the wartime
support command posts.
Streamlining Command and Control
In addition to building a robust command structure, the PLAN also reduced command inefficiencies
wherever possible. Through the process of reshuffling and downgrading its forces, the PLAN
eliminated a dozen division leader grade headquarters and an even greater number of regiment leader
grade headquarters. This process flattened the command structure for both maritime forces and
aviation forces. The virtual elimination of the MGD command structure streamlined near seas
defense operations under the six new bases. Before reform, a series of a dozen division-grade MGDs
acted as intermediary command entities for maritime forces. However, through the creation of the six
bases, these MGDs were disbanded, and their assets resubordinated directly under the bases.34 In
doing so, the PLAN eliminated a full command layer, thus improving the flow of information across
echelons. This process also reduced the span of control at the fleet level, as now all maritime forces
were subordinate to the new bases. A similar process occurred in naval aviation. All fighter and
fighter-bomber regiments were disbanded, and their subordinate flight groups were placed directly
under aviation brigades.35 This process accomplished a similar flattening of the command structure
by removing the regiment level of command for combat aircraft.
Shifting South
The PLA’s vague reference to “shifting the center of gravity to the south” is likely a signal that the
PLAN will strengthen its relative force posture in the Southern Theater area of operations. While
only a small part of the larger PLA reforms, changes to the PLAN’s infrastructure in the Southern
Theater will provide a jumping-off point for operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Although
the PLAN did not create new organizations or relationships, it modernized its support organizations
to support far seas operations. China views much of its maritime access as being blocked by U.S.
allies, with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines forming a geopolitical barrier impeding
far seas operations. When geopolitical constraints are combined with the geography of the first island
chain, which limits the number of submarine transit lanes into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the best
access in a wartime environment is through the South China Sea.
PLAN maritime and aviation support infrastructure in this region is undergoing a major
modernization. Aside from the dramatic land reclamation and military construction in the Spratly
Islands, PLAN facilities on Hainan are also quietly being modernized. Based on open source
imagery, the Southern Theater Navy Comprehensive Support Base immediately east of Yulin is
currently building a large dry dock capable of accommodating an aircraft carrier. Lingshui Airfield
袁文先 [Yuan Wenxian], 联合作战指挥机关工作教程 [Lectures on Joint Operations Command
Organ Work] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2008).
33
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30, 2017, p. 4.
34
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Station is also undertaking a large construction project that likely includes an additional runway and
aircraft shelters designed for fighter-sized aircraft. Both of these projects suggest the development of
a support infrastructure on Hainan that is capable of supporting aircraft carrier operations.36

The Sword—Organizing for Far Seas Naval Operations
The PLAN also operates in the far seas, giving Chinese leaders options for more proactive measures
in both war and peace—in essence, serving as the “sword” to “shield” erected in the near seas.
Although the reforms clarified operational and administrative control over most PLA forces, how the
PLA commands forces deployed beyond China’s immediate periphery remains less certain. Each
Theater Command now clearly has operational control over naval forces within its area of
responsibility (AOR), but the actual geographic bounds of Theater Command AORs are unlikely to
span the globe.
In peacetime, the Theater Commands and their naval components play some role in far seas training
and thus presumably operations by extension. For instance, in January 2019 the PLAN’s Task Force
174 (consisting of a destroyer, frigate, amphibious transport dock, and replenishment ship) undertook
a month-long training cruise in the South China Sea and Western and Central Pacific, functioning as
a “far seas joint training task force” (远海联合训练编队).37 It was also described as the “Southern
Theater Command Navy far seas joint training task force” (南部战区海军远海联合训练编队).38
The cruise required the “training task force command post” (训练编队指挥所) to cooperate with the
command organs of the Southern Theater Command, the Southern Theater Command Navy, the
Southern Theater Command Air Force, and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), in order to further “far
seas oceanic combat system construction” (远海大洋作战体系构建).39 Thus, the exercise was
expressly designed to build the Theater Command’s capacity to control and direct some joint far seas
operations.
PLA press described the event as a “routine element of the Theater Command Navy’s annual plan”
(战区海军年度计划内的例行性安排), implying that the operational skills, capacities, and practices
that such activities seek to build are themselves viewed as inherent to the role of Theater Commands
and their service component organs.40 In addition, the exercise was described as a test of the
“wartime command system” (战时指挥系统)41, indicating that far seas joint operations commanded
by Theater Commands are an inherent element of wartime operations. The fact that the task force
apparently operated in the Central Pacific, beyond even the second island chain, gives some
indication of how Theater Command authority may extend to the far seas, though not its outer
bounds.

36
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Conversely, there is little evidence to suggest that the PLAN counterpiracy task group in the Gulf of
Aden is commanded through the Theater Command structure. This begs the question, who
commands naval forces operating outside of Theater Command AORs? At first glance, the Joint Staff
Department Operations Bureau’s Overseas Operations Division (frequently referred to as the
Overseas Operations Office) appears to be a plausible match to command and control such forces in
the far seas. However, its status as an administrative office and its relatively junior grade (division
grade) rule this out. Indeed, the only sensible option for commanding far seas and overseas
operations outside of the Theater Command structure is some entity operating more directly under
CMC authorities, giving rise to several possibilities. One option is for far seas operations to be
commanded directly by the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center. A second possibility is that
PLAN Headquarters Operations Command Office (海军作战指挥室) commands such operations
through CMC authorities. A third possibility is that the mysterious Navy Special Activities
Command and Control Group (海军专项行动指控组)42 commands and controls PLAN operations
occurring outside Theater Command AORs. Unfortunately, there is no substantive evidence available
to suggest which of these is most likely.
Ultimately, the further one moves from away from China geographically, the less clear naval
command responsibilities become. While naval training task forces do operate under Theater
Command control in nominally far seas contexts, there are limited indications that Theater Command
authority extends beyond this point, especially for naval forces. CMC organs or the PLAN
headquarters could exercise command and control in such contexts, but this will not prove a
workable solution in the long run if or when China’s overseas military presence expands in scope and
intensity. This is especially the case if China intends to engage in more than counterpiracy and
humanitarian operations in places such as the Indian Ocean and Middle East, as the concomitant
increases in the span of control would likely over-burden CMC-level organs.

Conclusion
The PLA’s ongoing reforms serve to bring its organizational structure more in line with the evolving
strategic outlook it has been professing for nearly two decades. For the PLAN, these organizational
changes have had their greatest impact on its capacity for near seas operations. As befits China’s
broader national strategy, the PLA and the PLAN have been reconfigured primarily to suit the task of
fighting and winning a regional war fought in China’s immediate maritime near-abroad.
In the context of far seas operations, the primary benefit to the PLAN of recent organizational and
structural changes has been to lay the groundwork for future capabilities, rather than the direct
development of such capabilities themselves. As other analysts have noted, further structural reforms
and innovations will be required at the command level before the PLA can undertake large-scale
overseas operations in non-permissive environments.43 The reforms to date have strengthened the
PLA’s ability to achieve air and sea control within the first island chain—a prerequisite for major far
seas naval operations in wartime. The PLA has also created a modest foundation for limited
operations outside of the first island chain by establishing some command and control relationships
for far seas missions.

CCTV-7, 军事报道 [Military Report], November 3, 2017
See Philip C. Saunders, “Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations,” Strategic Forum
No.306 (July 2020) for an up-to-date assessment of the overseas command and control issues confronting the PLA, and
some speculative analysis on how they can and will be solved.
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Nonetheless, in order to effectively sustain high-intensity operations in the far seas, the PLA will
either have to scrap its mainland-centric command structure or carve out additional theater-level
commands focused exclusively on operating forces beyond China’s immediate periphery. It is likely
that such a change will happen organically and progressively as the PLA and PLAN continue to
garner further experience with the practical realities of far seas operations. While the PLA and PLAN
may be working to an envisioned end-state, it is likely that we will see an evolution through multiple
command arrangements over a period of a decade or more as the Chinese military eases itself into
larger and more complex operations overseas. Given that China continues to face a comparatively
benign security environment in historical terms, the PLA will likely have the time to work its way
through the problems of far seas command and control. Of course, should that security environment
radically change for the worse, then all bets are off as to both the speed with which the PLA’s
overseas command and control structure is developed as well as the PLA’s relative priority on far
seas operations.
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